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Abstract
The composition of lenders has changed dramatically since the crisis, and non–bank
lenders have become important players in the commercial mortgage–backed securities
(CMBS) markets. Comparing banks to non–bank lenders, we investigate whether the
geographical distance between lenders, borrowers and their properties is reflected in
the pricing of US mortgages that were included in US CMBS pools during the 2000 to
2017 period. We find that a doubling in bank–borrower distance is associated with a
2.5 basis point increase in the spread, and that this effect is more pronounced if the
loan is collateralized by a riskier property. Geographical distance does not seem to
have any effect on the loan spread for mortgages granted by non–bank lenders. The
difference in loan pricing across originator types (even after controlling for key mort-
gage and property characteristics) suggests banks and non–bank lenders have different
incentives, lending technologies, and/or different types of borrowers.
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1. Introduction
A long line of work on financial intermediation provides evidence that geography matters
for lending. Geographical distance weakens not only pricing power but also lenders’ ability
to acquire information. These effects are found to be present in different settings such as
M&A (Ragozzino and Reuer (2011)), venture capital (Tian (2011)), small business lending
(Petersen and Rajan (2002), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), Bellucci et al. (2013)), and
syndicated lending (Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012)). However, the finance literature has
largely ignored the effect of geographical distance in the commercial mortgage backed secu-
rities (CMBS) market.
Moreover, the CMBS market provides a good setting in which to analyze the effect
of geographical distance on loan originations, given the heterogeneity of loan underwriters
comprising banks as well as non–bank lenders such as finance companies, pension funds and
insurance companies. The composition of lenders has changed dramatically in the CMBS
market. For example, major banks like Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs collectively represented more than 90 percent of the CMBS
loan origination business in 2012, but their share dropped to roughly 65 percent by the end
of 2015.1 Our dataset also reflects the fact that while banks were the dominant lenders in
the CMBS market before the crisis, non–bank lenders have increased their share since the
crisis. The aggressive growth in lending especially by non-bank lenders could suggest riskier
lending by those financial institutions.
Geographical distance is an important phenomenon affecting lenders’ ability to collect
information. While distance effects have not been specifically investigated for the CMBS
markets, the emerging trends in lender composition make it possible to investigate how banks’
and non–bank lenders’ loan pricing differ from one another in the context of geographical
distance. In this paper, we investigate how geographical distance affects the spread on loans
that are subsequently packaged into commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS), also
thereby comparing banks and non–bank lenders’ loan pricing.
We analyze this phenomenon by using geographical distance as a proxy for reduced access
to soft information. As the CMBS market has been given a lot of attention by government
1https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-bonds-abs/new-cmbs-risk-rules-threaten-smaller-
lenders-access-idUSL8N14Q3HQ20160108
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regulators since the 2008 financial crisis, loan pricing in the CMBS market remains a relevant
question. The CMBS market has very different characteristics from residential mortgages and
much less is known about it. CMBS pools contain fewer loans compared to the large pools
of residential mortgage–backed securities due to the size of commercial mortgages (Baghai
and Becker (2018)). The standardization in the residential mortgage market, especially the
standard scoring system, makes soft information less relevant for lenders. On the other
hand, commercial properties are more heterogeneous than residential properties, making
soft information more critical for commercial mortgage and CMBS originators (Titman and
Tsyplakov (2010)). To answer our research question, we focus on two dimensions of distance
in this setting: the distance between originator and borrower, and the distance between
borrower and real estate collateral.
Geographical distance is likely to be salient and positively associated with the loan spread
in the CMBS market for two main reasons. First, even though screening over distances is
costly for loan originators, they continue to screen borrowers and invest in soft information
because of reputation concerns. In that sense, reputation is a non-contractual incentive
that serves as a mechanism that disciplines lenders to screen and monitor borrowers even
for loans that are subsequently securitized (Titman and Tsyplakov (2010)). Thus, the loan
spread might be higher due to the screening cost arising from originator–borrower distance if
originators set higher loan rates following a simple rule of mark-up over marginal cost, which
we refer to as the marginal cost pricing hypothesis. Second, if the lender’s signal about the
borrower’s creditworthiness diminishes with originator–borrower distance, the spread might
be higher due to the adverse selection risk. We call this the adverse selection hypothesis.
On the other hand, most existing studies find a negative distance–spread relation, which
is attributed to spatial price discrimination (see, e.g. Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse
and Ongena (2005), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)): Local lenders exploit their monopoly
power and charge borrowers higher interest rates. In the CMBS market, however, we argue
that borrowers are less subject to spatial price discrimination and rent extraction by lenders
due to the supra–regional nature of CMBS lending and the degree of competition between
lenders, most of whom are headquartered on the coastal region of the US, and located far
away from inland real estate borrowers. Thus, in contrast to the existing literature, we
expect a positive relation between lender–borrower distance and the loan spread.
We also hypothesize that the effect of originator–borrower distance on the spread should
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be more pronounced for riskier property type collaterals. If risk is increasing in originator–
borrower distance, it should matter most when the loan is collateralized by a risky property
type, because it will be repaid from the cash flows generated by those properties. Hotel and
industrial property types have the most volatile cash flows, while apartments’ cash flows are
less risky (Titman et al. (2005)).
Alternatively, we also evaluate the impact of distance between the borrower and the
property. For borrowers located farther away from their properties, asymmetric information
about local market conditions should be more marked. For example, it might be difficult
for those borrowers to distinguish between immediate income and future value of the cash
flows generated by the property. To fully assess the quality of a building or its location, one
needs to visit it, talk to tenants, and stroll around the area. Since lenders know this, we
hypothesize that the loan spread increases with distance between borrower and property.
We use a dataset of loans issued in the US over the period 2000-2017 that are subsequently
securitized. The dataset covers 26,303 conduit loans originated by US banks, bank holding
companies and non–bank lenders exclusively for direct sale into the secondary market. The
dataset includes rich information on the loans and the properties, as well as information
about the borrowers and the lenders.
Our results show that a greater bank–borrower distance is associated with higher loan
spreads. We find that the spread difference between a typical loan extended by a lender
located in the direct vicinity of the borrower and a loan extended by a lender 893 miles
away - the median distance in our sample for banks - is 17 basis points. To put this in
perspective, the median loan size in the sample is USD 6 million, so this additional spread
implies approximately USD 10,000 in additional annual interest costs. We also find that this
effect is more pronounced for riskier collateral assets, such as industrial, retail, and office
properties. For example, the additional annual interest cost is on average USD 22,000 for
industrial properties relative to apartments. Similarly, we analyze and show that the distance
effect is less pronounced for large-size loans, as they are more likely to be transparent.
We do not find any effect for non–bank lenders. The difference in loan pricing across
originator types even after controlling for key mortgage and property characteristics suggests
that banks and non–bank lenders have different incentives, lending technologies, and/or
different types of borrowers.
We also perform default analysis. We find that the distance between originator (closest
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branch for banks) and borrower increases default probability for loans originated by banks
and non–bank lenders. This indicates that access to soft information is a predictor of loan
performance, but it is only priced in by banks, and not by non–bank lenders. Mainly, our
findings can be interpreted as showing that non–bank lenders incorporate soft information
less than banks, indicating riskier lending decisions by the former.
This paper contributes in several ways to previous research on information problems
in lending markets, and specifically in the CMBS market. The CMBS market is a major
source of funding for commercial real estate loans in the US, with an outstanding balance
that peaked at USD 871 billion in 2007 and was around USD 495 billion in 2017, according
to NAREIT.2 First, our main contribution is to investigate how different types of lenders,
specifically banks and non–bank lenders, price loans in the presence of informational frictions
associated with geographical distance. The role of geographical distance in loan transactions
has been investigated in different market settings, such as syndicated lending and small
business lending. Less well understood, however, is how different types of intermediaries set
the price in that case. The CMBS market offers a perfect setting to investigate this question,
given the diversity of the loan originators. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first to investigate the differences in the impact of geographical distance on loan pricing by
comparing banks to non–bank lenders in a single setting, the CMBS market.
Second, our paper builds on the CMBS literature by improving our understanding of
lending practices in the CMBS market. We find that the loan spread increases with bank–
borrower distance, whereas the geographic distance does not seem to have any effect in
the case of the loan spread for non–bank lenders. One strand of the literature examines
how securitization affects the willingness of lenders to bear the cost of due diligence activi-
ties. Black et al. (2012) investigate differences across originator types in the CMBS market
and conclude that loans originated by insurance companies, commercial banks, and finance
companies perform better than loans originated by investment banks and foreign entities.
Also, their results show that, despite the potential for engaging in adverse selection, balance
sheet lenders underwrite higher quality loans. Titman and Tsyplakov (2010) link screening
incentives to the reputation hypothesis. They show that when mortgage originators have
experienced poor stock performance in the recent past, the credit spreads of CMBS mortgage
loans originated by these institutions are larger. The authors argue that their findings are
2https://www.reit.com/news/blog/market-commentary/other-side-cmbs-wall-maturities
5
consistent with the idea that originators relax underwriting standards when they are doing
poorly and when they are more concerned about short–run profitability than about their
reputation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical mo-
tivation for our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data and the measurement of
the variables. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 gives the results of
additional robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
2.1. Motivation
Theories of financial intermediation suggest that lenders must be given appropriate incentives
for screening and monitoring (Ho¨lmstrom and Tirole (1997)). In the “originate-to-hold”
model, this incentive is provided by the performance of the illiquid loans on their balance
sheets (Diamond and Rajan (2001), Keys et al. (2010)). However, in the “originate-to-
distribute” model, lenders intend to oﬄoad credit risk after issuing loans (Purnanandam
(2011)). Due to the lack of their own “skin in the game” as a result of securitization,
the lenders’ incentive to collect private information on loan quality is weakened, possibly
to such an extent that the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection become apparent
in subsequent loan performance (An et al. (2009, 2011); Black et al. (2012); Rajan et al.
(2015)). In fact, this “lack of doing one’s homework” due to securitization was exactly what
many commentators and policy makers pointed to when seeking to explain the origins of the
great financial crisis of 2008.3
However, the securitization process of mortgage loans is a repeated game, in which a
lender repeatedly originates loans that are then sold to CMBS purchasers (Rajan et al.
(2015)). Due to this repeated nature of securitization, lenders have an incentive to build
and maintain a good reputation for originating high–quality loans. The originator knows
that issuing low–quality loans with a higher likelihood of poor performance will hurt his
reputation and may lead to a loss of future economic rents. For example, if defaults are too
3See, e.g., Luis A. Aguilar, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Realigning Incentives in the Securitization
Market, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, March 30, 2011, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2011/spch033011laa-item-1.htm
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high in a given year, CMBS purchasers can punish a lender by not buying his loans in the
future (Titman and Tsyplakov (2010), Rajan et al. (2015)). Thus, the need to build and
preserve a good reputation could provide lenders with a non–contractual incentive to collect
and screen soft information, and to use it in their loan acceptance and pricing.
Existing research has provided mixed evidence regarding securitization and the incen-
tives for financial intermediaries to appropriately screen and monitor borrowers. Keys et al.
(2010) investigate whether the securitization process reduces the incentives of financial inter-
mediaries for careful screening of subprime mortgage loans in the US, and find evidence that
it does. Conversely, by investigating both securitized and unsecuritized loans in the Italian
prime mortgage market, Albertazzi et al. (2015) find that for given observable characteris-
tics, securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non-securitized mortgages.
They show that the underlying mechanism is originator reputation; banks do seem to care
about their reputation for not selling lemons.
However, these studies are limited to the residential mortgage market, with a focus on
the subprime market, which is a very specific segment of the credit market. Much less is
known about the CMBS market, which has very different characteristics to the market for
residential mortgages. For example, unlike residential mortgage–backed security asset pools,
which contain many residential mortgages, CMBS asset pools usually consist of relatively few
loans, due to the large size of commercial mortgages (Baghai and Becker (2018)). Therefore,
CMBS have more concentrated real estate risk, and understanding the quality of each of
the underlying loans and their real estate collateral becomes more important, especially
since commercial property is much more heterogeneous than residential property. Moreover,
CMBS loans have prepayment protection, making default risk more important.
Furthermore, for residential mortgages, loan originators tend to use standardized scoring
systems that ignore soft information. However, soft information such as reliability of the
owners and alternative uses of property plays an important role for commercial mortgage
origination (Titman and Tsyplakov (2010)). Since gathering soft information is likely to be
costly, geographic distance becomes more important in the CMBS market.
Another important phenomenon in the CMBS market is the emerging trend in the com-
position of lender types. Using our sample, Figure 1 reflects the trend in the composition of
commercial mortgage lending by banks and non–bank financial institutions. While before
the crisis, banks dominate CMBS lending, the trend reverses during the post–crisis period.
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Lending grows overall, but non–banks possibly engage in more aggressive lending.4 These
trends make the research questions we address in this paper more important as little is
known about them. For instance, we expect that this aggressive lending can potentially
indicate riskier lending by non–bank lenders relative to banks, along with the likelihood of
soft information being ignored.
[Figure 1 here]
2.2. Hypotheses Development
Economic theory suggests two factors in the role of geographical distance in loan transactions:
information costs and transportation costs. First, geographical distance affects information
costs incurred by both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers may incur search costs associ-
ated with information acquisition about loan products and conditions offered by alternative
lenders. Lenders may face information costs that vary with distance, as the quality of the
signal that the lender receives decreases with the distance. In traditional lending (originate-
to-hold), lenders are not willing to supply credit to distant borrowers who have been rejected
by lenders with superior information, because of the “winner’s curse” threat (Alessandrini
et al. (2009)). However, when uninformed lenders do provide loans to distant borrowers,
they may charge higher risk premia due to the risk of granting loans to an adversely selected
pool of applicants rejected by potentially better informed lenders.
One could also argue that if the borrowers or their real estate collateral are not nearby,
lenders most likely rely on real estate agents’ local market research (i.e. professional brokers)
to ameliorate information asymmetry problems. In that case, the spread might be lower given
that the information asymmetry is thereby reduced. However, maintaining a relationship
with real estate agents likely imposes a cost on the lenders (Alessandrini et al. (2009)).
Therefore, even if real estate agents are engaged in the loan underwriting process, the spread
might still be higher due to the cost arising from distance.
Second, borrowers and lenders may incur transportation cost. If borrowers face higher
transportation cost when visiting competing lenders, local lenders may engage in spatial price
4CMBS issuance declined in 2016 due to many factors such as market uncertainty and implementation
of new regulations. The Dodd-Frank Act requires issuers of all types of asset-backed securities to retain at
least a 5 percent share of any security they issue, as determined by its fair value.The risk retention rule that
is part of this act was implemented in December 24, 2016.
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discrimination. Accordingly, local lenders accumulate market power and extract rents from
nearby borrowers. Evidence of such spatial price discrimination is found in small business
lending (Degryse and Ongena (2005), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)), which shows a negative
relation between bank–borrower distance and interest rates. In the CMBS market, however,
it is likely that borrowers are less subject to price discrimination by banks as they are not
solely reliant on bank loans. Borrowers are able to raise financing from non–bank lenders,
and banks do not know where their competitors are, given the wide geographic distribution
of these lenders.
Banks may also incur transportation costs when screening borrowers. The screening
process includes the evaluation of the financial performance of the borrower, and the effort
by the bank management to obtain soft information on the borrower and the loan collateral
(Gehrig (1998)). Any travel costs incurred by the bank make loan originations to distant
borrowers costlier (Alessandrini et al. (2009)). The cost a bank must incur to screen and
monitor such a borrower is relative to the distance between the bank and the borrower
(Sussman and Zeira (1995), Almazan (2002)). Given that screening costs increase with
bank–borrower distance, banks might incorporate this cost in loan terms by setting higher
loan rates following a simple rule of mark–up over marginal cost (Bellucci et al. (2013)).
In that case, the loan spread should be positively associated with bank–borrower distance.
Indeed, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) find a positive relation between distance and the
loan spread for large borrowers in the syndicated loan market, which they attribute to the
costly delegated monitoring process for lenders.
One may wonder why originators are even willing to extend loans to far–away borrowers.
This may have to do with the high competition in the CMBS market, driving conduit lenders
to expand their radius. In this market, banks are competing with each other, but increasingly
also with non–bank lenders operating in the regulatory shadows.
Given that the information cost effect and the transportation cost effect on loan spreads
point in the same direction, and that spatial price discrimination is less likely in the CMBS
market, we expect that loan spread increases with distance between lender and borrower.
We additionally expect this relationship to be more pronounced for banks compared to non–
bank lenders.
Hypothesis 1: The loan spread increases with distance between lender and borrower.
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Next, we consider how the loan spread varies with the property type. Commercial mort-
gage default varies systematically with property type (Vandell et al. (1993), Ciochetti et al.
(2002), An et al. (2011)). Apartments are characterized by lower levels of uncertainty and
less sensitivity to the business cycle than retail and office (An et al. (2011)), so multi–family
loans are the least risky. If risk is increasing with originator–borrower distance, this should
matter most when the loan is also collateralized by a risky property type, because the loans
will be repaid from cash flows generated by those properties. Therefore, we argue that the
effect of geographical distance on the loan spread should be more pronounced if loans are
collateralized by a risky property type such as hotel or industrial property. We also expect
that banks might pay more attention to the riskiness of the collateral asset compared to
non–bank lenders.
Hypothesis 2: The increase in loan spread is more pronounced for riskier property types.
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) argue that information considerations are important in
real estate markets for two reasons. First, the real estate market is illiquid, so conveying
information to market participants is a slow process. Second, real estate assets are idiosyn-
cratic and difficult for non–locals to value. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) employ the
distance between borrower and property as an indirect proxy for asymmetric information.
By testing the implications of the “no trade” theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), they
find that market participants resolve information asymmetries by purchasing nearby prop-
erties. For borrowers located closer to the properties, asymmetric information about local
market conditions is less severe, so the lender receives a more precise signal about those
borrowers’ understanding of local market conditions. The distance between borrower and
property is highly relevant in the CMBS market, since this market allows CMBS investors
to invest easily in a variety of geographic locations for diversification reasons. Therefore,
we expect that lenders predicate their loan pricing on borrowers’ access to soft information
regarding local market conditions, which would imply a positive relationship between loan
spread and borrower–property distance. Similarly, we expect this relationship to be more
prominent for banks compared to non–bank lenders.
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Hypothesis 3: The loan spread increases with distance between borrower and property.
We now turn to our dataset to test these hypotheses.
3. Data and Variables
3.1. Sample Construction
We use a dataset of commercial mortgages provided by Real Capital Analytics Inc. (RCA),
a leading data provider in commercial real estate. Our primary sample of CMBS conduit
loans includes 55,892 commercial mortgages that were originated between January 2000 and
August 2017. The loan originators in the larger dataset are heterogeneous in terms of their
financial activities. The categories include banks, corporate, developer/owner/operator, eq-
uity fund, finance, government, insurance, investment manager, pension fund, REIT, REOC,
and religious institutions. The largest category in the dataset is “Bank”. We classify all other
types of originators as “Non–bank.”
We exclude syndicated loans and focus exclusively on sole–lender loans. Similarly, we
exclude loans to multiple borrowers. Following the loan pricing literature, we drop the loans
to Real Estate Investment Trusts and banks from the sample. Finally, we exclude non–US
lenders as well as borrowers located outside the US. The final sample includes 26,303 loans
for 24,885 unique real estate properties to 8,538 unique borrowers.
The market for commercial property conduit loans is quite concentrated. Wells Fargo,
Citigroup, JP Morgan, Ladder Capital, Morgan Stanley, Berkadia, Bank of America and
Goldman Sachs are among the top ten originators, and together comprise 46.9 percent of
our sample.
Table A.1 shows the sample distribution by property type. The apartment is the most
common type of collateral property. 36.27 percent of the collaterals for the loans originated
by the banks are apartments, while 54.07 percent of the collaterals for non–bank loans are
apartments. Overall, this implies that the non–bank lenders’ collateral portfolio has lower
levels of uncertainty and less sensitivity to the business cycle.
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3.2. Variables
Our sample provides information on the loans, the collateralizing properties, the lenders and
the borrowers. We will use this subsection to present and discuss all variables. We begin
with the distance variable, which is our key explanatory variable. Appendix B provides
information regarding the definition of all variables used in the study.
3.2.1. Measurement of Distance
We calculate distances using geographic coordinates. RCA data contains latitudes and lon-
gitudes for borrower, property and headquarter of the lender. CMBS loans are typically so
large and complex in comparison to other mortgages that on the depositor side, Regulation
AB II requires a certification by the chief executive officer (CEO) of the depositor stating
that the securitization as described in the prospectus is designed to produce cash flows from
the assets in amounts sufficient to service expected payments on the securities. Hence, the
senior management team of a lender is likely to be involved in the loan approval decision,
term setting, and loan pricing. We therefore focus on the locations of lenders’ headquar-
ters.5 We do also consider the possibility of local branch involvement in the loan application
process, and assess the effect of branch location, in the robustness section.
Because of the skewness and the possible nonlinearity of the economic impact of distance,
we employ a logarithmic transformation of distance. Ln(1 + DistanceOriginator−Borrower) is
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus distance (in miles) between the originator
headquarter and the borrower. Similarly, we define Ln(1 + DistanceOriginator−Property) and
Ln(1 + DistanceBorrower−Property).
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows a map of the US depicting the headquarter locations of the originators.
New York accounts for twenty–five observations, including the headquarters of Citigroup, JP
Morgan, Ladder Capital and Morgan Stanley which are among the top ten originators in our
sample. Another relevant concentration is in California with twelve observations, including
5Unlike in studies on small business lending, top management involvement in the lending decisions is
also argued in the syndicated loan market (see, e.g. Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012); Hollander and Verriest
(2016)).
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Wells Fargo. First National Bank Alaska is headquartered in Alaska, which is not shown on
the map.
[Figure 3 here]
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the 8,510 borrowers of our sample across the US.
Although we observe clusters of borrowers in the major urban areas in the West and the
North East, we also have a sizeable number of borrower observations in other regions. Of
all loans in the sample, 21.33 percent are to borrowers in California, mostly clustered in
the major urban centers like the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles. New York and
Florida are the other two states with major borrower clusters, with 11.21 percent and 5.57
percent of our sample located in these states, respectively.
[Figure 4 here]
Figure 4 shows the distribution of locations for the 24,812 properties in the sample. The
map shows that the main US urban areas are all represented in the sample, with California,
Texas and Florida the most important locations: 31.50 percent of the loans are collateralized
by properties located in these states.
3.2.2. Mortgage Loan Characteristics
Our dependent variable Spread is mortgage spread. We define mortgage spread as the
difference between the mortgage rate and the Treasury bond rate with the same maturity,
at the mortgage origination date. We restrict our sample to fixed-rate mortgages. Figure 5
shows the average loan spread over time, plus and minus one standard deviation. For each
year, the dot depicts the mean spread, and the bar shows the plus and minus one standard
deviation range. The blue line shows the average spread, 225 bps, for the whole sample
period. We see that there is a sharp increase in average spread during the 2008 financial
crisis, and that the standard deviation of loan spreads is very large in 2009. Although spreads
have come back down after the crisis, they are not as low as they were between 2003 and
2007, and seem to be hovering around their average level for the sample period.
[Figure 5: Spread by Years]
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Standard risk considerations of commercial loan underwriting involve the loan–to–value
ratio (LTV). The LTV ratio of a loan is measured as the loan amount divided by the ap-
praised value of the real estate collateral. Previous studies find that LTV is correlated with
loan performance (Archer et al. (2002); Ambrose and Sanders (2003)), and that LTV is
an important predictor of default risk (An et al. (2011)). We therefore expect LTV to be
positively related to mortgage spreads.
Along with LTV, the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is another important predictor
of default risk. DSCR measures the ability of a commercial property to cover debt service
payments from the rental revenue. After the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions were
heavily criticized for the relaxation of pre–crisis underwriting standards, for example by
basing the DSCR on estimates of future rents, rather than on actual or historical rental
income (Black et al. (2012)). We anticipate that DSCR is negatively correlated with the
spread.
We also control for observable loan characteristics such as loan size and loan maturity.
We expect that loan size is negatively related to spread due to economies of scale in lending.
That is, the costs of making loans to small borrowers tend to be relatively greater than the
costs of making loans to large borrowers. We similarly control for loan maturity and expect
that this negatively affects spreads on CMBS loans. Commercial mortgages with a longer
maturity have a lower default risk than those with a shorter maturity (An (2007)).
3.2.3. Property Characteristics
Our data on the collateral properties is quite rich. We have six property types in the dataset:
rental apartment, hotel, industrial, office, retail, and other. We construct six indicator
variables for these property types and use “apartment” as the base case in the regressions.
The most common property type is apartment, with 42.46 percent of the loans collateralized
by apartment assets. Apartments are characterized by lower levels of uncertainty and less
sensitivity to the business cycle than retail and office (An et al. (2011)), whereas properties
with volatile and cyclical cash flows such as industrial and hotels are viewed as the riskiest
forms of commercial property collateral. We therefore expect loans to finance apartments to
have lower spreads, followed by office, retail and hotel with industrial property loans having
the higher spreads.
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Titman et al. (2005) find that newer properties have lower spreads. This is likely because
property age is a proxy for quality. Older properties are likely to be of lower quality, with a
lower structure value relative to land value, increasing the moneyness of the redevelopment
option, and therefore increasing the likelihood of redevelopment. This flexibility is likely to
increase the spread (Titman et al. (2005)). Moreover, the age of a property is also a proxy
for the degree of information asymmetry (Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004)). Properties with
longer cash flow histories provide investors with more information about the property and
local market conditions. We have the age of the properties at the mortgage origination date.
Since it is likely that the age of the property does not affect the spread linearly, we use
indicator variables for different age categories: less than 10 years old, between 10 and 20,
between 20 and 30, between 30 and 40, between 40 and 50 and more than 50 years old. This
argument about higher spreads for mortgages on properties with more investment flexibility
also applies to properties that can be renovated. We therefore include an indicator variable
that equals one if the property has been renovated.
We also control for height of the properties. The number of stories can be associated
with spread for a variety of reasons. First, properties with a large number of stories generate
additional rental income. For example, in some cities such as New York City, where land
costs are high and plot sizes are small, building height is more important for total rentable
space than the horizontal area (Barr (2010)). Second, there may be economies of scale
associated with lower transaction costs in making loans to larger properties. For 65 percent
of our sample, the number of stories is equal to one. Therefore, we define an indicator
variable, Number of Stories>1, for the properties which have more than one story.
Another important factor in real estate quality and risk is the location. Assets located in
or near a city’s central business district tend to have less vacancy risk in down markets. This
implies that their rental cash flows are less dependent on the business cycle. We therefore
define an indicator variable for whether the property is located in the central business district
(CBD). We expect the spread to be lower for loans involving properties located in CBDs.
3.2.4. Other Control Variables
In addition to these mortgage and property–specific variables, we also include a set of other
variables that are known to affect loan spreads. Specifically, we include quarterly time–
fixed effects to control for interest rate conditions that vary from quarter to quarter. We
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also include indicator variables for stated loan purposes: property acquisition or refinance.
Following the literature (Ciochetti et al. (2002); Ambrose and Sanders (2003); Titman and
Tsyplakov (2010); An et al. (2011)), we also introduce fixed effects for the state where the
property is located, as commercial mortgage default varies with geographic location. As a
proxy for the level of competition in a state, we include the log of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) of originator concentration in the state in which the borrower is located. We
construct the HHI based on the market share by loan amount of each originator in a given
state and year. A higher HHI means that concentration is high, possibly reducing spreads.
Existing research, for example An et al. (2011), argues that investors pay a substantial
premium for CMBS loans originated by lenders who have a strong reputation for strict
underwriting in the commercial mortgage market. In order to take lender reputation into
account, we include lender–fixed effects in all models.
3.3. Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the key variables. The spread has a mean value of
224 basis points and a median value of 225 basis points. The spread on non–bank loans is
on average significantly higher than the spread on bank loans.
[Table 1: Summary Statistics]
Average originator–borrower distance is 1,131 miles, and lenders are located, on average,
1,083 miles away from the property collateral. The shortest distance is the one between
borrower and property and it is, on average, 537 miles. The distance series are skewed; the
median originator–borrower distance is 928 miles, the median originator–property distance
is 926 miles, and the median borrower–property distance is 209 miles.
In Figure 6 and Figure 7, we present mean and median distances between loan orig-
inator, borrower and property. The correlation between, DistanceOriginator−Borrower and
DistanceOriginator−Property is quite high (0.64). For three hundred and fifty–two observa-
tions, the minimum value of DistanceBorrower−Property is 0. In most cases, these properties
are apartments and offices.
[Figure 6 and 7]
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The average LTV is 65 percent, with apartments having the highest LTV ratios at an
average of 67 percent, and hotels the lowest, at an average of 61 percent. This pattern
supports the view that LTV ratios are endogenously chosen to allow for the riskiness of the
property type (Titman et al. (2005)). The average DSCR is 1.74. The average maturity for
loans is 118 months. The average loan size is USD 11 million, with a median size of USD 6
million. The largest loan is for USD 1.035 billion, for an office building in Manhattan.
On average, 6 percent of the loans are collateralized by the properties located in a central
business district (CBD), and 27 percent of the properties are renovated. The HHI equals
0.05, on average.
4. Results
4.1. Baseline Results
We now turn to our estimation results. We first test whether distance between lenders and
borrowers is priced after controlling for observable mortgage and property characteristics.
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates of equation (1) using mortgage originations by banks,
non-banks, and all types of lenders. Xi represents a vector of control variables, such as loan
purpose, MSA, state where the property is located, originator, borrower and year–quarter
time fixed effects.
Spread =β0 + β1Ln(1 +DistanceOriginator−Borrower) + ΣαiProperty Characteristics+
ΣγiMortgage Characteristics+Xi + ǫ
(1)
[Table 2: Originator-Borrower Distance and Spread]
The results in Table 2 show that the coefficient on Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) is
positive and statistically significant for the full sample. When we repeat our analysis for
the subsample of banks, Column (3) and (4) show a positive and statistically significant
coefficient on Ln(1+Distance Originator−Borrower), suggesting that the spread increases with
distance between bank and borrower. The estimates are also economically significant. Hold-
ing other variables constant, a 100 percent increase in distance is on average associated with
a 2.5 basis points increase in spread (column (4)). Summary statistics in Table 1 show a
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median distance of 893 miles, so our model would predict a 17 basis points increase in spread.
Thus, for a median loan (USD 6 million), the increase in total interest costs would be USD
10,000.
We find that bank–borrower distance is positively associated with the loan spread. These
results are at odds with previous literature showing a negative relationship due to spatial
price discrimination. Naturally, such price discrimination, and thus bank hold–up problem,
is less likely in the CMBS market, as borrowers are able to raise financing from non–bank
lenders. Instead, we attribute our results to marginal cost pricing or adverse selection.
In columns (5) and (6), we do not find any significant effect of geographic distance on
loan pricing for the loans originated by non–bank lenders. This indicates that non–bank
lenders have different screening techniques and/or different types of borrowers.
Control variables enter with the expected signs. Consistent with the literature that has
found lower default risk for commercial mortgages with longer maturities than those with
shorter maturities, we find a negative relationship between loan maturity and spread. The
spread is also significantly lower for larger loans.
The coefficient on the loan to value ratio also has the expected positive sign, and when we
replace the loan to value ratio with the debt service coverage ratio (column(2), (4) and (6)),
we find that the results are robust for including DSCR as a control variable. Unsurprisingly,
the DSCR variable is statistically significant and negative, indicating that a higher DSCR
reduces the spread.
For banks and all types of lenders, the property type coefficients are in line with expec-
tations in the sense that loans for the riskier property types have higher spreads, and that
loans financing apartments, the omitted category in the regression, have the lowest spreads,
also in line with their lower risk. For non–bank originators, only the categories hotel and
other type are positively related to spread. Building height and a central business district
(CBD) location do not seem to play a role in CMBS loan spreads.
4.2. The Effect of Property Type
Next, we employ property type interactions in a similar fashion to An et al. (2011). Mort-
gage loans collateralized by apartments are much more homogeneous, and therefore easier
to judge, than hotel, retail, office and industrial loans, suggesting that the effect of distance
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should be stronger for the latter property types. To explore this hypothesis, we include
interaction terms between main property types and Ln(1 +DistanceOriginator−Borrower). In
our estimation, the baseline is apartments (as in Titman et al. (2005)). Table 3 presents
the results. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms are positive and statistically
significant for industrial, office, and retail properties for banks, but not for non–banks. In
particular, we find that the effect of originator–borrower distance on spread is more pro-
nounced for mortgages collateralized with riskier property types, since the interaction terms
are highest for industrial and hotel properties. This effect is also economically significant.
For example, the additional interest cost for a median loan is USD 22,000 for industrial
properties relative to apartments.
[Table 3: The Effect of Property Type]
4.3. Borrower–Property Distance and Spread
We also consider the distance between borrower and property as an indirect measure of
information asymmetry, and we also expect that increasing distance is associated with higher
spreads here. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) argue that buyers located closer to a property
likely have a better understanding of local market conditions and can more easily and cheaply
evaluate the property. Ling et al. (2018) show that distant buyers tend to overpay in the
commercial property market. Eichholtz et al. (2016) find that office properties owned by
distant investors have lower occupancy. If originators are aware of this, they will prefer
borrowers that are close to their assets, which may be reflected in loan pricing.
In order to differentiate borrower distance to the originator, we create an indicator vari-
able, D, which is equal to one if Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) is smaller than
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Property). We also define MinimumDistance = {Ln(1+Distance
Originator−Borrower), Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Property)}.
Spread =β0 + β1MinimumDistance ∗D + β2Ln(1 +DistanceBorrower−Property) ∗D+
ΣαiProperty Characteristics+ ΣγiMortgage Characteristics+Xi + ǫ
(2)
We report the results in Table 4. The coefficient on Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower),
when borrower is closer to originator relative to property, is positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level for banks, but not for non–bank lenders. That is, spread increases with
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distance between originator and borrower. However, the economic effect is relatively small
in comparison to our baseline results and is USD 5400 for a median loan.
In column (3) and column (4), we also find a weakly significant and positive effect for
borrower–property distance if the property is located closer to the originator relative to the
borrower (D=0). Conversely, we find a significant and negative effect for borrower–property
distance if the borrower is located closer to the originator relative to the property (D=1).
One possible explanation for these contradictory results is that the borrower–property
distance does not matter for our borrowers given their expertise and industry focus. Our
findings are therefore more in line with Conklin et al. (2018) who argue that information
asymmetries are likely to be relatively small for REITs when investing at a distance, and
contradict the informational argument in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004).
[Table 4: Borrower-Property Distance and Spread]
4.4. The Effect of Loan Size
Thus far, we find that loan spreads increase with originator–borrower distance. In this sec-
tion, we analyze the impact of loan size on originator–borrower distance and loan pricing.
Previous literature (e.g.Wittenberg-Moerman (2008)) argues that loan size is typically pos-
itively correlated with borrower size. The effect of distance might be more pronounced for
small–size loans because small borrowers are more subject to asymmetric information prob-
lems. In contrast, large borrowers are usually more transparent. Moreover, a larger loan
could enjoy a lower spread due to economies of scale in underwriting. To investigate these
predictions, we split our sample into three groups based on the loan size and create two
indicator variables: (i) Small Loans, which takes a value of one for loans in the lower tercile,
and zero otherwise, and (ii) Large Loans, which takes a value of one for loans in the top
tercile and zero otherwise.
Table 5 presents the results. As before, the coefficient on Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower)
is positive and statistically significant for banks, but not for non–banks lenders, meaning that
loan spread is increasing with bank–borrower distance. In all columns, in addition to the
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower)*Small Loans interaction we also include the interaction of
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower)*Large Loans. Thus, the coefficient on the interaction term
should be interpreted as the marginal effect of loan size as compared with loans in the middle
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group.
In column (3) and (4) of Table 5, the coefficient on Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower)*Small
Loans is not significant, but the coefficient on Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower)*Large Loans
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the effect of bank–
borrower distance on spread is less pronounced for larger loans relative to the middle group,
and that this holds true for both lender groups.
[Table 5: The Effect of Loan Size]
4.5. Default Analysis
Our analysis consistently shows that loan spread increases with bank–borrower distance.
A logical question is whether this effect is due to the information cost (adverse selection
hypothesis) or transportation cost (screening hypothesis/marginal cost pricing). It is very
difficult to make this distinction in the absence of a natural experiment, but we can use aux-
iliary data on loan performance based on the assumption that loan performance is positively
correlated with borrower creditworthiness.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on mortgage histories up until their maturities in our
dataset. However, we have information about the status of a total of 1,097 mortgages that
are defined as “Resolved”, “Restructured/Extension”, and “Troubled”. Given our limited
data, we classify them all as defaulted mortgages. The 1,097 mortgages that we label as
defaulted represent 4.1 percent of our total sample.
Because some loans in the sample had not reached maturity at the time of observation,
we estimate the Cox proportional hazard (CPH) model, to account for a possible right-
censoring problem, which is a standard tool in the CMBS literature for default analysis. We
test whether distant borrowers are more likely to default. If all the information associated
with borrower risk is captured by hard information, we would not expect the coefficient of
the distance variable to be significant.
[Table 6: Hazard Model]
Table 6 presents the result. The estimates are expressed in terms of hazard ratios. A
hazard ratio of less than one indicates a decrease in the probability of default, whereas a
hazard ratio greater than one indicates an increase in the probability of default. In column
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(2), we report the estimates for our bank sample, where we measure bank-borrower distance
using lender headquarters. Hazard ratio is not statistically significant.
In column (3), we replace bank headquarter–borrower distance with bank branch–borrower
distance. The estimate for bank branch–borrower distance is greater than one and statis-
tically significant at %1 level, which suggests that greater bank branch–borrower distance
predicts a greater probability of default. Controlling for spread, the estimate is statistically
significant, which suggests that all the information relating to mortgage risk is not captured
by hard information at the time of origination.
In column (4), we report the estimates for our non–bank sample. Greater distance
predicts a greater probability of default. Overall, our findings indicate that distance between
the originatior and the borrower predicts default and increases default probability for both
banks and non–banks. However, our analysis in the previous sections shows that only banks
incorporate distance into their loan pricing. This indicates that non–bank lenders conduct
riskier lending in the CMBS markets.
5. Robustness Tests
In this section, we perform several robustness tests.
5.1. Bank Branch-Borrower Distance
Throughout our analysis, we focus on the locations of banks’ headquarters. However, it is
likely that local bank branches also engage in the administrative and screening process of
the loan application. Therefore, in this section, we repeat our baseline regression with bank
branch–borrower distance instead of distance relative to headquarters.
We obtain bank branch data from the SNL Financial LC. We discard observations if a
branch was not open when the loan was issued, and subsequently calculate the borrower’s
distance to the nearest branch. The results are presented in Table 7. The coefficient remains
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for most specifications after controlling
for observable property and mortgage characteristics. The magnitude of the coefficient on
distance is comparable to that which we reported in column (3) and (4) of Table 2, but is
slightly smaller, which makes sense given the smaller average distance between borrowers
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and branches relative to headquarters. So, we can conclude that our key distance result is
robust to this alternative specification of bank location.
[Table 7: Bank Branch-Borrower Distance]
5.2. Do Out-of-State Borrowers Pay More?
Next, we investigate whether our results are robust to the inclusion of an additional measure
of distance: distance in jurisdicton rather than in miles.
Existing studies show that out–of–state investors pay economically meaningful premiums
relative to their in–state counterparts. This premium is found both for apartment complexes
(Lambson et al. (2004)), office buildings (Ling et al. (2018)) and commercial real estate
markets in general (Agarwal et al. (2018)). The likely reason is that local investors have
informational advantages relative to their out–of–state counterparts. For local investors, it
is easier and cheaper to obtain local soft information by inspecting buildings and locations,
reading local newspapers, and interacting with residents and other building users. Thus,
they have superior information relative to non–local investors (Agarwal et al. (2018)).
To test whether the previously found effect of distance on spread is due to the out–of–
state effect, we define an indicator variable. “Out–of–State Borrower” that is equal to one
if borrower and property are not located in the same state, and zero otherwise. Moreover,
following (Agarwal et al. (2018)), we only include loan transactions in which the borrower
appears for the first time in the host state.6 That is, if the borrower has more than one loan
in a host state, we only include the first loan.
[Table 8: Out-of-State Borrower]
We present the estimated results in Table 8. In columns (1), (3) and (5), we run the
regressions for “first–time borrowers”, and find that controlling for the “out–of–state” ef-
fect does not meaningfully affect the coefficients on Ln(1 +DistanceOriginator−Borrower). In
columns (2), (4), and (6) we run the regressions for the loans originated by all types of
lenders, banks and non-banks, respectively, and find similar effects to before. Across all the
columns of Table 8, “Out–of–State Borrower” remains insignificant.
6Of course, we can only assess this as far as our dataset goes, and it may be possible that a borrower has
been active in a city without appearing in our dataset. So this variable is estimated with some error.
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5.3. The Effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis
To rule out the possibility that our findings are mainly due to the 2008 financial crisis, we
construct an indicator variable, Post–crisis, which is equal to one for the years after 2009,
and interact it with Ln(1 +DistanceOriginator−Borrower). Specifically, we estimate the model
in equation (3):
Spread =β0 + β1Ln(1 +DistanceOriginator−Borrower) + β2Post-crisis+
β3Ln(1 +DistanceOriginator−Borrower) ∗ Post-crisis+
ΣαiProperty Characteristics+ ΣγiMortgage Characteristics+Xi + ǫ
(3)
[Table 9: The Effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis]
Table 9 presents the regression results. The estimate on Post–crisis is positive for both
lender types, but only statistically significant for banks. This suggests that spreads have
gotten higher since the 2008 financial crisis for bank originators, but that non–bank origi-
nators have adjusted their pricing behavior less than banks. The interaction term between
Post–crisis and Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) is statistically insignificant across all the
columns of Table 9.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the loan spread increases with bank–borrower distance in the
CMBS market. This effect is more pronounced for the risky property types and less pro-
nounced for large–size loans. On the other hand, we do not find any significant effect from
geographical distance on the spread of loans originated by non–bank lenders.
In contrast to the findings in previous literature on spatial price discrimination, we find a
positive relation between distance and the loan spread. We argue that CMBS borrowers are
less subject to price discrimination and rent extraction by banks due to the nature of CMBS
lending and the location of the competitors. Instead, we propose alternative explanations
for the effects of geographic distance on the loan spread, based on screening cost and adverse
selection risk.
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One question naturally arises: Why do banks allocate loans to long–distance borrowers in
the first place? First, given the strong competition and new entrants in the CMBS market,
conduit lenders must expand their reach, or gradually lose market share. Moreover, while
portfolio lenders are more comfortable making loans to borrowers that are nearby, conduit
lenders can make loans for a borrower who is buying a property in a different state. Second,
as default rates and timing vary across regions, lenders could wish to seek geographical
diversification in their loan portfolios.
The evidence presented here shows that despite technological transformations in the
banking industry, geographical distance remains a significant factor for loan pricing. These
results are consistent with the conceptual arguments of Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012), who
show that the role of distance has not been eliminated by the advancement of information
technology in the syndicated loan market.
We do not find any effect of geographical distance for non–bank lenders, but spreads on
non–bank loans are on average significantly higher than spreads on bank loans. Additionally,
our default analysis shows that distance matters for loans originated by both banks and
non–bank lenders but only banks price distance. This suggests that non–bank borrowers are
riskier. The difference in loan pricing between originator types even after controlling for key
mortgage and property characteristics is consistent with bank and non–bank lenders having
different incentives, lending technologies, and/or different types of borrowers.
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Figure 1: Distribution of loan volumes originated by years.
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Figure 2: Distribution of lender headquarters
The map shows the location of the 100 lender headquarters we observe in our sample between
2000:Q1 and 2017:Q3. Alaska and Hawaii are not shown.
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Figure 3: Distribution of borrowers
The map shows the location of the 8,510 unique borrowers we observe in our sample between
2000:Q1 and 2017:Q3. Alaska and Hawaii are not shown.
Figure 4: Distribution of properties
The map shows the location of the 24,812 unique properties we observe in our bank subsample
between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q3. Alaska and Hawaii are not shown.
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Figure 5: Spread by years
The diagram shows the average loan spread over time, plus and minus one standard deviation. For
each year, the dot depicts the mean spread, and the bar shows the plus and minus one standard
deviation range. Blue line shows the average spread, 225 bps, for the whole sample period.
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Figure 7: Lender-Borrower-Property median distances, in miles.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes: This table reports summary statistics by loan. Number of observation is 11,458 for loans originated
by banks, and 14,845 for loans originated by non-banks. Sample period 2000:Q1–2017:Q3. All variables are
defined in the Appendix.
Full Sample Bank Non-Bank
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Dependent Variable
Spread (bps) 224.95 225 69.75 215.99 218.5 69.48 231.87 230 69.18
Geographical Distance
DistanceOriginator−Borrower (miles) 1,131.55 928.52 887.85 1,145.36 893.83 897.14 1,120.89 949.24 880.49
DistanceOriginator−Property (miles) 1,083.11 926.67 779.85 1,091.43 866.59 817.88 1,076.68 953.75 749.14
DistanceBorrower−Property (miles) 537.10 209.96 674.65 569.79 257.61 692.03 511.87 175.85 659.85
DistanceBranch−Borrower (miles) 244.22 2.99 442.10
Mortgage Characteristics
Loan to Value Ratio (LTV) 0.65 0.68 0.12 0.64 0.68 0.13 0.65 0.68 0.12
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) 1.74 1.56 0.98 1.82 1.58 1.35 1.68 1.55 0.54
Maturity (months) 118.01 120 34.55 116.95 120 33.74 118.83 120 35.14
Loan Size ($million) 11.89 6.00 22.75 12.77 6.29 24.25 11.21 5.80 21.49
Property Characteristics
Age of the Property
11-20 years 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38
21-30 years 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
31-40 years 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36
41-50 years 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35
Over 50 years 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33
Central Business District 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Renovated 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44
Number of Stories >1 0.35 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.48
Other Variables
Out-of-State Borrower 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.52 0.49
Post-crisis 0.80 0.39 0.74 0.43 0.84 0.35
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.10
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Table 2: Originator–Borrower Distance and Spread
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the loan spread, be-
tween the mortgage rate and the Treasury bond rate with the same maturity, in basis points.
DistanceOriginator−Borrower is the geographic distance between originator headquarter and borrower, in miles.
Control variables include indicator variables for age of the property, loan purpose, MSA, and state where
the property is located. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
MSA level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample Bank Bank Non-Bank Non-Bank
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 1.705*** 1.397*** 2.648*** 2.542*** 1.074 1.257
(0.562) (0.529) (0.656) (0.666) (0.959) (0.891)
Ln(1+Maturity) -55.478*** -61.900*** -49.335*** -51.463*** -69.755*** -74.625***
(3.306) (3.630) (5.721) (6.278) (4.186) (4.629)
Ln(Loan Size) -5.034*** -4.990*** -4.492*** -4.573*** -4.680*** -4.582***
(0.530) (0.561) (0.758) (0.743) (0.728) (0.732)
Loan to Value Ratio 41.445*** 19.612** 31.521***
(6.211) (9.723) (8.149)
Debt Service Coverage Ratio -17.526*** -12.438*** -19.284***
(2.412) (3.859) (2.457)
Ln(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) 0.713 0.252 4.199** 3.532* -2.645 -2.292
(1.494) (1.395) (1.976) (1.931) (2.329) (2.168)
Number of Stories >1 0.394 0.732 1.613 1.295 -0.658 -0.481
(1.109) (1.167) (1.691) (1.686) (1.252) (1.289)
Central Business District 0.545 -0.423 -4.100 -3.775 2.484 1.783
(2.235) (2.392) (3.132) (2.963) (3.276) (3.312)
Renovated 1.052 0.820 -0.616 -0.597 -0.022 -0.130
(0.970) (0.927) (1.219) (1.166) (1.269) (1.223)
Hotel 45.016*** 53.051*** 44.743*** 50.732*** 35.996*** 39.012***
(5.343) (5.916) (10.095) (11.075) (9.651) (8.422)
Industrial 18.375*** 14.910*** 15.056** 14.577** -1.569 0.589
(3.701) (3.948) (6.800) (6.595) (5.252) (5.223)
Office 13.992*** 14.709*** 11.552** 12.982*** 5.449 6.627
(3.048) (3.149) (4.488) (4.076) (5.349) (5.125)
Other 14.438*** 15.359*** 13.787*** 14.426*** 11.993** 12.508**
(3.628) (3.204) (4.178) (4.006) (5.965) (5.818)
Retail 15.878*** 15.029*** 23.523*** 24.850*** -0.636 0.888
(2.372) (2.454) (4.950) (5.228) (4.686) (4.402)
Constant 463.889*** 583.305*** 435.580*** 493.677*** 441.359*** 565.152***
(26.610) (30.531) (34.055) (51.283) (42.964) (50.655)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Originator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,508 25,098 10,999 10,736 14,509 14,362
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.828 0.854 0.859 0.847 0.851
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Table 3: The Effect of Property Type
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the loan spread, be-
tween the mortgage rate and the Treasury bond rate with the same maturity, in basis points.
DistanceOriginator−Borrower is the geographic distance between originator headquarter and borrower, in
miles. Control variables include indicator variables for age of the property, loan purpose, MSA, and state
where the property is located. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the MSA level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dependent variable: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample Bank Bank Non-Bank Non-Bank
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) -0.675 -0.591 -0.919 -1.068 0.338 0.600
(0.694) (0.649) (1.536) (1.487) (1.192) (1.085)
Hotel 12.838 30.318*** 42.415 46.970* 13.119 17.756
(10.883) (11.206) (26.107) (26.982) (17.393) (14.276)
Industrial -18.907** -15.412* -24.156 -25.899 -21.306* -17.118
(8.332) (9.176) (15.742) (17.881) (11.660) (10.962)
Office -6.136 -4.339 -26.094** -25.173** -4.570 -2.747
(5.756) (6.111) (11.526) (11.415) (11.692) (10.898)
Other 10.793 7.972 -26.061 -27.300 5.268 -5.024
(12.783) (11.678) (19.298) (17.997) (18.242) (26.075)
Retail -6.906 -6.033 -4.849 -4.170 -7.236 -2.136
(7.619) (7.141) (12.469) (11.735) (16.881) (16.194)
Hotel#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 5.526*** 3.720** 0.245 0.485 3.937 3.647
(1.619) (1.634) (3.789) (3.895) (2.664) (2.410)
Industrial#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 6.167*** 5.047*** 6.496** 6.749** 3.435* 3.098*
(1.295) (1.405) (2.639) (2.982) (1.967) (1.769)
Office#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 3.125*** 2.999*** 6.000*** 6.094*** 1.608 1.534
(1.061) (1.105) (1.629) (1.669) (1.854) (1.696)
Other#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 0.649 1.240 5.982** 6.245** 1.105 2.783
(1.902) (1.780) (2.687) (2.501) (2.746) (3.925)
Retail#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 3.592*** 3.337*** 4.456** 4.579** 1.150 0.607
(1.164) (1.094) (1.887) (1.819) (2.384) (2.312)
Ln(1+Maturity) -55.599*** -61.918*** -49.771*** -51.963*** -69.734*** -74.686***
(3.285) (3.622) (5.825) (6.421) (4.191) (4.661)
Ln(Loan Size) -5.082*** -4.997*** -4.410*** -4.454*** -4.704*** -4.598***
(0.510) (0.546) (0.751) (0.734) (0.734) (0.733)
Loan to Value Ratio 40.230*** 21.391** 31.575***
(6.073) (9.479) (8.090)
Debt Service Coverage Ratio -17.190*** -12.504*** -19.300***
(2.345) (3.901) (2.442)
Ln(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) 0.484 0.078 3.838* 3.209* -2.675 -2.312
(1.482) (1.381) (1.975) (1.926) (2.338) (2.183)
Number of Stories >1 0.350 0.711 1.467 1.144 -0.719 -0.538
(1.086) (1.142) (1.636) (1.609) (1.260) (1.303)
Central Business District -0.037 -0.876 -4.029 -3.798 2.423 1.708
(2.277) (2.447) (3.147) (2.996) (3.271) (3.305)
Renovated 1.056 0.807 -0.746 -0.721 -0.020 -0.138
(0.942) (0.903) (1.190) (1.121) (1.273) (1.222)
Constant 473.775*** 586.720*** 455.895*** 514.266*** 444.308*** 568.988***
(26.753) (30.047) (35.215) (53.312) (43.100) (51.409)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Originator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,508 25,098 10,999 10,736 14,509 14,362
Adjusted R2 0.822 0.829 0.855 0.860 0.847 0.851
36
T
a
b
le
4
:
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
–
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
D
is
ta
n
c
e
a
n
d
S
p
r
e
a
d
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
O
L
S
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
lo
a
n
sp
re
ad
,
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
m
o
rt
g
a
g
e
ra
te
a
n
d
th
e
T
re
a
su
ry
b
o
n
d
ra
te
w
it
h
th
e
sa
m
e
m
at
u
ri
ty
,
in
b
as
is
p
oi
n
ts
.
D
is
ta
n
ce
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
−
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
is
th
e
ge
og
ra
p
h
ic
d
is
ta
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
b
o
rr
ow
er
a
n
d
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
in
m
il
es
.
T
h
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
ab
le
D
eq
u
al
s
to
on
e
if
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
O
r
ig
in
a
to
r
−
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
)
is
sm
al
le
r
th
an
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
O
r
ig
in
a
to
r
−
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
),
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e.
M
in
im
u
m
D
is
ta
n
c
e
=
{L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
O
r
ig
in
a
to
r
−
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
),
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
O
r
ig
in
a
to
r
−
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
)}
.
C
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
u
d
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
lo
a
n
p
u
rp
o
se
,
p
ro
p
er
ty
ty
p
e,
M
S
A
,
an
d
st
at
e
w
h
er
e
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
lo
ca
te
d
.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
d
efi
n
ed
in
th
e
A
p
p
en
d
ix
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
M
S
A
le
v
el
,
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
d
en
ot
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
S
p
re
ad
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
F
u
ll
S
am
p
le
F
u
ll
S
am
p
le
B
an
k
B
an
k
N
on
-B
an
k
N
on
-B
an
k
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
O
r
ig
in
a
to
r
−
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
),
w
h
en
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
cl
os
er
to
or
ig
in
at
or
th
an
b
or
ro
w
er
is
0.
72
3
0.
59
4
0.
55
5
0.
51
7
1.
16
9
1.
32
3*
(0
.5
47
)
(0
.4
72
)
(0
.7
49
)
(0
.7
10
)
(0
.8
06
)
(0
.7
68
)
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
O
r
ig
in
a
to
r
−
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
),
w
h
en
b
or
ro
w
er
is
cl
os
er
to
or
ig
in
at
or
th
an
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
1.
03
1*
0.
85
0*
1.
72
8*
*
1.
60
6*
*
1.
02
6
1.
26
4*
(0
.5
41
)
(0
.4
81
)
(0
.6
67
)
(0
.6
73
)
(0
.7
46
)
(0
.6
99
)
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
−
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
),
w
h
en
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
cl
os
er
to
or
ig
in
at
or
th
an
b
or
ro
w
er
is
0.
91
3*
*
0.
78
7*
1.
08
2*
0.
97
1*
0.
62
2
0.
83
7*
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.3
98
)
(0
.5
58
)
(0
.5
50
)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.4
27
)
L
n
(1
+
D
is
ta
n
ce
B
o
r
r
o
w
e
r
−
P
r
o
p
e
r
ty
),
w
h
en
b
or
ro
w
er
is
cl
os
er
to
or
ig
in
at
or
th
an
p
ro
p
er
ty
is
-0
.0
84
-0
.0
38
-1
.0
33
**
-1
.0
08
*
0.
24
9
0.
32
7
(0
.3
57
)
(0
.3
47
)
(0
.5
12
)
(0
.5
33
)
(0
.4
86
)
(0
.4
51
)
L
n
(1
+
M
at
u
ri
ty
)
-5
5.
33
0*
**
-6
1.
78
0*
**
-4
8.
99
2*
**
-5
1.
12
4*
**
-6
9.
66
5*
**
-7
4.
55
6*
**
(3
.2
76
)
(3
.6
07
)
(5
.6
90
)
(6
.2
44
)
(4
.1
70
)
(4
.6
13
)
L
n
(L
oa
n
S
iz
e)
-5
.0
19
**
*
-4
.9
78
**
*
-4
.5
22
**
*
-4
.5
94
**
*
-4
.6
57
**
*
-4
.5
63
**
*
(0
.5
25
)
(0
.5
58
)
(0
.7
44
)
(0
.7
33
)
(0
.7
28
)
(0
.7
32
)
L
oa
n
to
V
al
u
e
R
at
io
41
.5
38
**
*
20
.6
07
**
31
.3
24
**
*
(6
.2
47
)
(9
.6
32
)
(8
.1
12
)
D
eb
t
S
er
v
ic
e
C
ov
er
ag
e
R
at
io
-1
7.
53
3*
**
-1
2.
44
9*
**
-1
9.
31
9*
**
(2
.4
24
)
(3
.8
66
)
(2
.4
62
)
L
n
(H
er
fi
n
d
ah
l–
H
ir
sc
h
m
an
In
d
ex
)
0.
76
7
0.
29
2
4.
23
7*
*
3.
53
4*
-2
.5
79
-2
.2
28
(1
.5
06
)
(1
.4
02
)
(1
.9
88
)
(1
.9
59
)
(2
.3
11
)
(2
.1
48
)
N
u
m
b
er
of
S
to
ri
es
>
1
0.
39
7
0.
73
2
1.
75
3
1.
42
0
-0
.7
01
-0
.5
20
(1
.1
06
)
(1
.1
65
)
(1
.6
73
)
(1
.6
72
)
(1
.2
52
)
(1
.2
90
)
C
en
tr
al
B
u
si
n
es
s
D
is
tr
ic
t
0.
74
0
-0
.2
56
-3
.8
51
-3
.5
28
2.
47
7
1.
82
6
(2
.2
20
)
(2
.3
69
)
(3
.2
34
)
(3
.0
54
)
(3
.2
96
)
(3
.3
22
)
R
en
ov
at
ed
1.
02
6
0.
80
1
-0
.6
84
-0
.6
73
-0
.0
66
-0
.1
74
(0
.9
69
)
(0
.9
24
)
(1
.2
50
)
(1
.2
03
)
(1
.2
56
)
(1
.2
11
)
H
ot
el
44
.9
24
**
*
52
.9
70
**
*
44
.0
96
**
*
49
.9
18
**
*
35
.9
86
**
*
39
.0
33
**
*
(5
.3
60
)
(5
.9
10
)
(9
.9
45
)
(1
0.
93
3)
(9
.6
31
)
(8
.3
78
)
In
d
u
st
ri
al
18
.2
86
**
*
14
.8
53
**
*
15
.1
00
**
14
.4
36
**
-1
.4
84
0.
76
9
(3
.6
54
)
(3
.9
07
)
(6
.6
34
)
(6
.4
54
)
(5
.2
11
)
(5
.2
09
)
O
ffi
ce
14
.0
80
**
*
14
.8
05
**
*
11
.5
76
**
12
.9
07
**
*
5.
61
0
6.
89
0
(3
.0
13
)
(3
.1
04
)
(4
.4
90
)
(4
.0
77
)
(5
.3
26
)
(5
.1
09
)
O
th
er
14
.3
91
**
*
15
.3
27
**
*
13
.9
21
**
*
14
.5
25
**
*
11
.8
42
**
12
.3
14
**
(3
.5
96
)
(3
.1
90
)
(4
.2
19
)
(4
.0
54
)
(5
.9
73
)
(5
.8
09
)
R
et
ai
l
15
.7
40
**
*
14
.9
27
**
*
23
.4
28
**
*
24
.6
91
**
*
-0
.6
41
0.
88
6
(2
.3
56
)
(2
.4
39
)
(4
.9
29
)
(5
.2
12
)
(4
.7
22
)
(4
.4
65
)
C
on
st
an
t
46
5.
75
1*
**
58
5.
07
8*
**
44
4.
36
8*
**
50
3.
69
3*
**
43
8.
74
1*
**
56
3.
10
4*
**
(2
6.
51
8)
(3
1.
59
2)
(3
4.
08
1)
(5
1.
71
0)
(4
2.
47
1)
(5
1.
07
0)
C
on
tr
ol
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
ri
gi
n
at
or
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
B
or
ro
w
er
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r-
q
u
ar
te
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
25
,5
08
25
,0
98
10
,9
99
10
,7
36
14
,5
09
14
,3
62
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
82
1
0.
82
8
0.
85
5
0.
85
9
0.
84
7
0.
85
1
37
Table 5: Loan Size
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the loan spread, be-
tween the mortgage rate and the Treasury bond rate with the same maturity, in basis points.
DistanceOriginator−Borrower is the geographic distance between originator headquarter and bor-
rower, in miles. The indicator variable Small Loans equals one for the loans in the lower ter-
cile, and zero otherwise. The indicator variable Large Loans equals one for the loans in the top
tercile, and zero otherwise. Control variables include indicator variables for age of the prop-
erty, loan purpose, property type, MSA, and state where the property is located. All vari-
ables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample Bank Bank Non-Bank Non-Bank
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 1.779*** 1.476*** 2.855*** 2.746*** 1.234 1.417
(0.574) (0.547) (0.663) (0.674) (0.972) (0.895)
Small Loans#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 0.446*** 0.279* 0.180 0.162 0.248 0.135
(0.170) (0.151) (0.260) (0.260) (0.212) (0.208)
Large Loans#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) -0.453*** -0.361** -0.568** -0.559** -0.466** -0.442**
(0.168) (0.167) (0.239) (0.241) (0.224) (0.223)
Ln(1+Maturity) -55.420*** -61.810*** -49.092*** -51.215*** -69.684*** -74.562***
(3.288) (3.605) (5.722) (6.282) (4.155) (4.613)
Ln(Loan Size) -3.467*** -3.866*** -3.188*** -3.311*** -3.472*** -3.599***
(0.718) (0.734) (1.105) (1.116) (0.825) (0.873)
Loan to Value Ratio 41.205*** 20.539** 30.990***
(6.221) (9.601) (8.296)
Debt Service Coverage Ratio -17.463*** -12.473*** -19.249***
(2.399) (3.912) (2.455)
Ln(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) 0.641 0.205 4.125** 3.448* -2.668 -2.293
(1.493) (1.393) (1.973) (1.935) (2.337) (2.171)
Number of Stories >1 0.457 0.775 1.653 1.330 -0.593 -0.429
(1.103) (1.162) (1.678) (1.675) (1.251) (1.286)
Central Business District 0.348 -0.527 -3.895 -3.594 2.337 1.699
(2.245) (2.393) (3.124) (2.945) (3.291) (3.320)
Renovated 1.118 0.872 -0.557 -0.537 0.017 -0.094
(0.963) (0.923) (1.212) (1.155) (1.267) (1.221)
Hotel 45.231*** 53.108*** 44.109*** 50.133*** 36.112*** 39.144***
(5.287) (5.902) (9.982) (10.981) (9.648) (8.420)
Industrial 18.387*** 14.909*** 15.189** 14.639** -1.353 0.749
(3.606) (3.885) (6.795) (6.604) (5.183) (5.131)
Office 13.818*** 14.569*** 11.348** 12.799*** 5.463 6.624
(3.022) (3.127) (4.480) (4.065) (5.297) (5.056)
Other 14.157*** 15.168*** 13.693*** 14.342*** 11.593* 12.199**
(3.606) (3.214) (4.184) (4.032) (5.969) (5.820)
Retail 15.783*** 14.966*** 23.404*** 24.739*** -0.706 0.823
(2.363) (2.436) (4.922) (5.189) (4.689) (4.397)
Constant 440.622*** 565.776*** 396.396*** 453.437*** 421.956*** 550.232***
(26.190) (29.016) (31.042) (48.320) (41.385) (49.426)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Originator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,508 25,098 10,999 10,736 14,509 14,362
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.828 0.855 0.859 0.847 0.851
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Table 6: Default Analysis
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of Cox-proportional hazard models explaining loan de-
fault. The indicator variable Loan Default equals one when the mortgage is classified either “resolved”,“re-
structured/extension” and “troubled”, and zero otherwise. For each variable, we present the hazard ratio.
DistanceOriginator−Borrower is the geographic distance between originator headquarter and borrower, in
miles. Control variables include indicator variables for age of the property, loan purpose, property type,
MSA, and state where the property is located. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the MSA level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Loan Default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Bank Bank-Branch Non-Bank
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 1.010 0.965 1.117**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.061)
Ln(1+DistanceBranch−Borrower) 1.084***
(0.027)
Spread 0.984*** 0.986*** 0.984*** 0.981***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(1+Maturity) 0.229*** 0.324*** 0.294*** 0.066***
(0.030) (0.049) (0.054) (0.022)
Ln(Loan Size) 1.007 1.110** 1.083 0.878**
(0.041) (0.054) (0.066) (0.058)
Loan to Value Ratio >75 3.472*** 3.207*** 3.379*** 4.623***
(0.545) (0.490) (0.626) (1.359)
Number of Stories >1 0.926 1.074 1.151 0.642*
(0.116) (0.135) (0.172) (0.165)
Central Business District 0.925 0.883 0.828 1.096
(0.230) (0.292) (0.244) (0.403)
Renovated 1.200** 1.024 1.047 1.334*
(0.109) (0.111) (0.131) (0.212)
Observations 25,508 10,999 10,337 14,509
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Table 7: Bank Branch–Borrower Distance and Spread
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the loan spread, between the
mortgage rate and Treasury bond rate with the same maturity, in basis points. DistanceBranch−Borrower
is the geographic distance between nearest bank branch and borrower, in miles. Control variables in-
clude indicator variables for age of the property, loan purpose, MSA, and state where the property is
located. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA
level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(1+DistanceBranch−Borrower) 1.734** 1.274*** 1.587*** 1.622***
(0.819) (0.479) (0.595) (0.581)
Ln(1+Maturity) -53.063*** -52.291*** -53.977***
(5.788) (5.755) (6.326)
Ln(Loan Size) -4.544*** -4.541*** -4.718***
(0.773) (0.746) (0.726)
Loan to Value Ratio 10.363 14.641
(10.144) (10.124)
Debt Service Coverage Ratio -11.714***
(3.804)
Ln(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) 5.005** 4.056* 3.511
(2.184) (2.148) (2.169)
Number of Stories >1 1.729 1.976 1.697
(1.687) (1.685) (1.706)
Central Business District -5.088 -5.938* -5.716**
(3.116) (3.021) (2.781)
Renovated 0.112 -0.135 -0.154
(1.411) (1.342) (1.316)
Hotel 48.897*** 41.699*** 48.152***
(10.329) (10.216) (11.229)
Industrial 16.059** 11.743* 11.547*
(6.586) (6.699) (6.769)
Office 17.178*** 12.200*** 13.962***
(3.525) (3.948) (3.646)
Other 20.482*** 15.997*** 16.748***
(4.060) (4.115) (3.965)
Retail 28.150*** 24.106*** 25.433***
(4.993) (5.072) (5.377)
Constant 212.610*** 491.921*** 490.366*** 531.718***
(2.523) (31.238) (30.307) (32.399)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,733 10,337 10,337 10,098
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.854 0.858 0.862
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Table 8: Out-of-State Borrowers
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the loan spread, be-
tween the mortgage rate and Treasury bond rate with the same maturity, in basis points. The
indicator variable Out-of-State Borrower equals one if the borrower and property are located in
different states, and zero otherwise. Control variables include indicator variables for age of the
property, loan purpose, property type, MSA, and state where the property is located. All vari-
ables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample-First Full Sample Bank-First Bank Non-Bank-First Non-Bank
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 2.065** 1.703*** 3.513** 2.671*** 2.254 1.093
(0.801) (0.562) (1.456) (0.658) (1.911) (0.960)
Out–of–State -0.402 0.507 -0.983 -2.152 1.833 1.319
(1.512) (1.338) (2.505) (1.658) (3.322) (1.950)
Ln(1+Maturity) -58.551*** -55.455*** -55.933*** -49.440*** -59.937*** -69.704***
(5.745) (3.310) (8.599) (5.736) (10.145) (4.194)
Ln(Loan Size) -4.232*** -5.035*** -3.686*** -4.474*** -3.798*** -4.677***
(0.655) (0.530) (0.972) (0.756) (1.081) (0.727)
Loan to Value Ratio 24.132* 41.429*** 39.720** 19.556** 6.354 31.502***
(14.347) (6.221) (16.452) (9.748) (23.051) (8.149)
Ln(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) 3.698 0.709 5.847 4.166** -1.026 -2.641
(2.876) (1.493) (3.713) (1.983) (4.753) (2.325)
Number of Stories >1 -1.244 0.388 0.218 1.662 -1.902 -0.660
(1.609) (1.114) (2.102) (1.697) (2.420) (1.254)
Central Business District 1.850 0.548 -2.215 -4.087 2.778 2.472
(3.140) (2.234) (3.815) (3.148) (4.930) (3.280)
Renovated 1.268 1.048 0.260 -0.622 1.090 -0.035
(1.187) (0.968) (1.558) (1.222) (1.815) (1.265)
Hotel 46.599*** 45.061*** 78.155*** 44.361*** 17.549 35.920***
(10.469) (5.332) (15.088) (10.010) (15.021) (9.609)
Industrial 16.797*** 18.383*** 25.505** 14.973** -0.003 -1.560
(5.723) (3.701) (10.725) (6.809) (10.913) (5.260)
Office 21.598*** 14.015*** 25.300*** 11.392** 15.644 5.439
(5.396) (3.047) (8.689) (4.475) (11.216) (5.366)
Other 24.284*** 14.401*** 24.489*** 13.897*** 18.650* 11.909**
(5.864) (3.627) (8.688) (4.212) (9.433) (6.015)
Retail 21.146*** 15.866*** 32.967*** 23.476*** 4.454 -0.692
(4.598) (2.374) (7.975) (4.940) (8.757) (4.701)
Constant 513.763*** 463.494*** 392.925*** 437.483*** 285.227*** 439.638***
(38.132) (26.549) (49.196) (34.248) (65.747) (42.804)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Originator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,439 25,508 7,326 10,999 9,113 14,509
Adjusted R2 0.879 0.821 0.915 0.854 0.902 0.847
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Table 9: The Effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the loan spread, between the
mortgage rate and Treasury bond rate with the same maturity, in basis points. DistanceOriginator−Borrower
is the geographic distance between originator headquarter and borrower, in miles. The indicator variable
Post-crisis equals one for the loans originated after the year 2009, and zero otherwise. Control variables
include indicator variables for age of the property, loan purpose, property type, MSA, and state where the
property is located. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors, clustered at the MSA
level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample Bank Bank Non-Bank Non-Bank
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) 1.777 2.044 3.332** 3.747** -0.292 0.362
(1.168) (1.292) (1.358) (1.563) (2.044) (2.107)
Postcrisis 66.528*** 56.047** 76.190*** 67.954* 37.642 59.315
(16.287) (27.329) (19.865) (40.012) (32.723) (40.805)
Postcrisis#c.Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) -0.090 -0.793 -0.907 -1.563 1.673 1.072
(1.203) (1.319) (1.582) (1.731) (2.084) (2.142)
Ln(1+Maturity) -55.482*** -61.961*** -49.319*** -51.431*** -69.655*** -74.537***
(3.321) (3.669) (5.721) (6.284) (4.193) (4.662)
Ln(Loan Size) -5.034*** -4.992*** -4.500*** -4.585*** -4.680*** -4.580***
(0.530) (0.563) (0.758) (0.745) (0.727) (0.732)
Loan to Value Ratio 41.455*** 19.509** 31.483***
(6.171) (9.721) (8.175)
Debt Service Coverage Ratio -17.545*** -12.445*** -19.270***
(2.439) (3.857) (2.468)
Ln(Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) 0.706 0.187 4.076** 3.311* -2.579 -2.249
(1.498) (1.397) (1.959) (1.890) (2.332) (2.172)
Number of Stories >1 0.396 0.745 1.613 1.296 -0.656 -0.482
(1.116) (1.173) (1.693) (1.688) (1.251) (1.290)
Central Business District 0.549 -0.398 -4.026 -3.660 2.394 1.734
(2.237) (2.407) (3.093) (2.914) (3.289) (3.325)
Renovated 1.052 0.823 -0.630 -0.598 -0.015 -0.130
(0.968) (0.930) (1.229) (1.164) (1.271) (1.226)
Hotel 44.999*** 52.989*** 44.828*** 50.873*** 35.624*** 38.766***
(5.354) (5.888) (10.161) (11.114) (9.643) (8.415)
Industrial 18.400*** 15.107*** 15.082** 14.569** -1.581 0.525
(3.749) (3.970) (6.810) (6.596) (5.275) (5.257)
Office 14.005*** 14.826*** 11.662** 13.177*** 5.479 6.614
(3.033) (3.139) (4.545) (4.140) (5.374) (5.141)
Other 14.459*** 15.484*** 14.021*** 14.818*** 12.086** 12.626**
(3.602) (3.197) (4.269) (4.053) (5.956) (5.815)
Retail 15.883*** 15.074*** 23.461*** 24.768*** -0.639 0.852
(2.375) (2.457) (4.899) (5.174) (4.705) (4.421)
Constant 379.803*** 579.835*** 430.807*** 485.470*** 451.280*** 571.130***
(26.470) (30.330) (36.246) (54.432) (42.213) (50.274)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Originator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,508 25,098 10,999 10,736 14,509 14,362
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.828 0.854 0.859 0.847 0.851
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Appendices
A. Sample
Table A.1: Distributions of Property Types
Notes: This table reports the number of loans by property types. Sample period: 2000:Q1–2017:Q3.
Numbers of Loans by Property Types
Property Types Number of Loans by Banks Number of Loans by Non–Banks
Apartment 4,156 8,026
Hotel 949 776
Industrial 607 948
Office 1,311 1,178
Retail 2,554 2,393
Other 1,881 1,524
Total 11,458 14,845
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B. Variable Definition
Variable Definition
Geographical Distance
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Borrower) The natural logarithm of one plus the distance between bank headquarter and
borrower. DistanceOriginator−Borrower is calculated from geographic coordi-
nates, in miles.
Ln(1+DistanceBranch−Borrower) The natural logarithm of one plus the distance between closest bank branch and
borrower. DistanceBranch−Borrower is calculated from geographic coordinates,
in miles.
Ln(1+DistanceOriginator−Property) The natural logarithm of one plus the distance between bank headquarter
and property. DistanceOriginator−Property is calculated from geographic co-
ordinates, in miles.
Ln(1+DistanceBorrower−Property) The natural logarithm of one plus the distance between borrower and property.
DistanceBorrower−Property is calculated from geographic coordinates, in miles.
Mortgage Loan Characteristics
Debt Service Coverage Ratio The ratio of the income generated by the property to the debt service required
by the loan.
Loan to Value Ratio The ratio of the loan to the value of the property.
Ln(1+Maturity) The natural logarithm of maturity, in months.
Ln(Loan Size) The natural logarithm of loan amount, in millions.
Large Loans An indicator variable that equals to one for loans in the top tercile of loan size,
zero otherwise.
Small Loans An indicator variable that equals to one for loans in the lower tercile of loan
size, zero otherwise.
Spread The difference between mortgage rates and Treasury bond rates with the same
maturities, in basis points.
Property Characteristics
Age of the Property Indicator variables identifying the age group of the property. Age groups in-
clude less than 10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, and more than 50.
Central Business District An indicator variable that equals to one if the property is located in a central
business district (CBD), zero otherwise.
Number of Stories>1 An indicator variable that equals to one if the number of stories is greater than
one, zero otherwise.
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Variables Description
Property Type
Apartment An indicator variable that equals to one if the property type is apartment, zero
otherwise.
Hotel An indicator variable that equals to one if the property type is hotel, zero
otherwise.
Industrial An indicator variable that equals to one if the property type is industrial, zero
otherwise.
Office An indicator variable that equals to one if the property type is office, zero
otherwise.
Retail An indicator variable that equals to one if the property type is retail, zero
otherwise.
Other An indicator variable that equals to one for another type of property, zero
otherwise.
Renovated An indicator variable and equals to one for the properties renovated, zero oth-
erwise.
Other Variables
Ln(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) The natural logarithm of the summed squares of bank market shares, in each
state.
Post–crisis An indicator variable that equals to one for the loans originated after the year
2009, zero otherwise.
Out-of-State Borrower An indicator variable that equals to one if the borrower and property are located
in different states, zero otherwise.
Loan Purpose
Property Acquisition An indicator variable that equals to one if the loan purpose is property acqui-
sition, zero otherwise.
Refinance An indicator variable that equals to one if the loan purpose is refinance, zero
otherwise.
Metropolitan Statistical Area FE Indicator variables identifying the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where
the property is located.
State FE Indicator variables identifying the state where the property is located.
Year-quarter FE Indicator variables identifying the origination year-quarter of the loan.
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